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The Peace Process
One Extreme In February 1974, in a Westminster general election, 11 out of the North’s then 12 constituencies returned anti-Agreement unionists. They were opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement, which had been negotiated a few months earlier between the Ulster Unionist party, under Brian Faulkner, and the SDLP, under Gerry Fitt. The eleven MPs were opposed to the power sharing executive at Stormont, disrupted its meetings, and were opposed to what was called the ‘Irish Dimension’ in the shape of a Council of Ireland which actually never met. Sinn Fein had yet to adopt an electoral strategy and the IRA was committed to armed struggle (though by Christmas of that year it would call a ceasefire). The new MPs, made up of dissident Ulster Unionists and Ian Paisley, then collaborated with the Ulster Workers Council and organised a general strike in May of that year. To bring the North to its knees the UWC had to rely on loyalist paramilitaries, mainly the UDA, but also the UVF, to hijack vehicles at gunpoint, close down roads and prevent people from going to work. The UDA commander, Andy Tyrie, and UVF leaders were on the UWC Co-ordinating Committee. During this period loyalist paramilitaries killed six Catholics in the Rose and Crown bar on the Ormeau Road, a husband and wife in Donaghmore, several Catholic workers, and two Catholic brothers who ran a bar in Ballymena. On the third day of the UWC strike loyalists, almost certainly helped by elements of British intelligence, planted car bombs in Dublin and Monaghan and slaughtered 33 children, women and men. When power and petrol supplies were cut Brian Faulkner was forced to resign and the power-sharing executive collapsed. The alliance of anti-Agreement paramilitaries and politicians triumphantly marched to Stormont. In the intervening 30 years, to the top of the hill, then down again to the bottom, is the only place these politicians have ever taken their people. Then, as now, the real issue wasn’t about the IRA, or ‘Sinn Fein/IRA’, but was about sharing power, equality and parity of esteem – principles which are alien to the raison d’etre of the six-county state and its culture of a ‘Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People’. Last week on television the DUP’s Gregory Campbell inadvertently admitted this when he said that even had the IRA decommissioned its weapons “with transparency” in October it still wasn’t the issue. The issue was the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, which “had given nationalists everything” – that is, some of their democratic entitlements. The whole issue of the IRA is just an excuse for unionists not to engage with the nationalist community. Some commentators have described the current deadlock as having been exacerbated by “ the election of the two extremes”, as if Sinn Fein is refusing to share power with unionists or doesn’t recognise unionist aspirations. Sinn Fein has genuinely pursued a dialogue with unionism. However, most unionists still adhere to the myth that the conflict in the North was one-sided, that the IRA was responsible for all violence. The DUP and its supporters need reminding of its history. In 1977 the DUP once again allied themselves to the UDA during another UWC strike. The stoppage lacked support and so the UDA turned to intimidation, shooting dead a Citybus driver in Belfast, Protestant Harry Bradshaw, in an attempt to stop public transport. The DUP set up a ‘Third Force’, a vigilante organisation in 1981, which operated illegal checkpoints and held rallies. In 1986 the DUP helped found Ulster Resistance, a paramilitary-style force whose members marched in military formation wearing red berets. There was the famous incident when Peter Robinson, armed with a firearm, led a loyalist mob in an attack on Clontibret garda station. He was found guilty of unlawful assembly and fined fifteen thousand punts. Members of Ulster Resistance were involved in industrial espionage and were caught selling details of Shortt’s blowpipe missile technology to the South African apartheid regime. Ulster Resistance, in collaboration with British Intelligence, smuggled into the North a large shipment of weapons that were used to kill several hundred nationalists in the 1990s. The DUP and other unionist representatives for decades have acted as cheerleaders for British army and RUC violence and have justified repression, torture, shoot-to-kill operations, exclusion orders, censorship and discrimination. Extremists were certainly elected last Wednesday but they were unionists. At the most, 34 or 35 unionist representatives out of a potential assembly of 108 members are opposed to the Belfast Agreement. The Agreement still has the support of a majority of people in the North, and was endorsed in referenda, passed as legislation in both Britain and Ireland and is lodged at the United Nations as an international binding Treaty. However, the very provision which was written into the Agreement to prevent abuse – that the executive and assembly require the consent of a majority of both unionist and nationalist elected representatives - gives the DUP, as the leading party of the unionist community, the power to prevent an inclusive executive from being formed. Ultimately, Britain is to blame for the supremacist mentality within unionism, which came with partition. That is not to say that things haven’t changed. Things have changed and many unionists are prepared to share power and recognise the compromises that nationalists and republicans have made in the interests of reconciliation. Sinn Fein, having emerged as the leaders for the nationalist community, has to face down the DUP. The DUP has declared that it will not share power with Sinn Fein and thinks that it can renegotiate the Agreement. It has yet to learn that there can be no assembly, no executive and no power for the DUP without the consent of Sinn Fein, and that the nationalist community is not about to give up or dilute rights which it took eighty years to secure.
IRA Easter Message 2004 "The leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann extends fraternal greetings to all Volunteers, to republican activists and to our supporters and friends at home and abroad. We send solidarity greetings to our imprisoned comrades and their families. On this, the 88th anniversary of the 1916 Rising, we especially remember our patriot dead and extend solidarity to their families. We commemorate the freedom fighters of all generations who have given their lives for Irish freedom. Ten years ago, we declared a complete cessation of military operations to enhance the democratic peace process. We stated our belief that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting settlement had been created. Our cessation was not only a definitive and powerful signal of our commitment to that process, it was also a defining moment in the recent history of this island. We stated that others, especially the British Government, had a duty to face up to their responsibilities. In an attempt to deflect from the significance of our initiative and evade their responsibilities, the British Government of that time and the political leaderships of unionism became fixated with achieving the surrender of the IRA. They failed and despite their opposition the peace process was created. In the period since, the IRA leadership has consistently demonstrated our commitment to advancing the process through a series of substantive initiatives, which have included:
Throughout the ten years of our cessation there has been very serious provocation from British securocrats, their military forces and their allies in unionist paramilitarism. In the same period, others within the British and Irish establishments have persisted with the idea of defeating republicans rather than moving forward. They are now on an offensive. The old conservative agenda has re-emerged. The unionist paramilitaries are responding to that. IRA guns remain silent, despite an onslaught of unionist paramilitary violence against Catholics, including hundreds of attacks and a number of killings over the last year. Today also, we are witnessing another attempt to criminalise and demonise republicans and the republican struggle. This time it is for selfish electoral reasons. Leading this are Irish politicians who stood idly by while Irish citizens, North and South, were being terrorised by the RUC, the British Army and their surrogates in the unionist death squads. Twenty-three years ago, the men and women in the H-Blocks and Armagh Gaol defeated the policy of criminalisation. Ten Irish republicans died on hunger strike in defence of the integrity of the republican struggle. This new attempt will also fail. Last October, agreements were made and commitments given. The IRA leadership fulfilled our commitments. The leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party and the two governments did not fulfil theirs. They acted in bad faith. Yet again the two governments are attempting to move the goalposts. This has caused justifiable anger. It is unacceptable that other protagonists should try to dictate the terms of our cessation. The honouring of agreements and commitments is critical in instilling confidence and demonstrating that politics can work. They are essential elements of building an enduring political process. The two governments, and in particular the British Government, must fulfil their commitments. Until they do so there can be little prospect of any progress. Beirigí bua." P.O'Neill Irish Republican Publicity Bureau
The decade of the Peace Process On 1 September 1994, An Phoblacht's front page carried a statement from the leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann calling for republicans to Seize the moment for peace. The historic statement announced a cessation after 25 years of armed struggle by the IRA and marked the beginning of the Peace Process. On this, the tenth anniversary of the cessation, Irish Republican Media maps out the significant milestones that led to the Army's decisive initiative and looks at some of the key events that have followed in the ten years since. Introduction The publication of Gerry Adams' 1986 book, The Politics of Irish Freedom; the subsequent production of A Scenario for Peace in May 1987; the 1988 Sinn Féin/SDLP talks; the publication of a Pathway to Peace; and the 1992 launch of Towards a Lasting Peace, were all crucial steps taken by republicans in the lead-up to the events of 1994. However, it was the 1993 Hume/Adams talks that marked the most substantial milestone in the Peace Process. Those talks and the resulting Irish Peace Initiative broke through the failure of the Brooke/Mayhew talks, which had begun in 1990 and collapsed a year later.
1993 April The initial reaction to the disclosure in April 1993 of renewed meetings between Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams and SDLP leader John Hume was far from positive. Fine Gael leader John Bruton described the first statement from the two party leaders as "little more than a propaganda front". The then leader of Democratic Left, Proinsias De Rossa, described the talks as a monumental error of judgement, saying the claim to national self-determination was a "dangerous self-delusion". May In the weeks after the Hume/Adams April statement, Sinn Féin increased its vote in the Six-County local elections by over 10,000, winning 51 seats and securing a greater share of the vote (23%) in Belfast City Council than any other party. June Martin McGuinness, speaking at Bodenstown, said: "I reiterate that the republican demand for a British withdrawal is not aimed at unionists. It is a demand that the people of Ireland, including Protestants, be allowed to control our own destiny and shape a society which is pluralist and reflective of the diversity of all our people." August An Irish-American delegation led by Bruce Morrison visited Ireland and met Sinn Féin representatives. September On 25 September, Adams and Hume announced they were suspending their talks having "agreed to forward a report on the decision reached to date to Dublin for consideration". The publication of the second statement generated intense media and political speculation. It was clear that the two party leaders had agreed a significant initiative designed to secure widespread support for an all-inclusive Peace Process. Their statement was greeted with the usual negativity from unionists. October Óglaigh na hÉireann issued a statement welcoming the Hume/Adams Initiative. The statement said: "Our Volunteers, our supporters, have a vested interest in seeking a just and lasting peace in Ireland." November The British Government admitted it had been involved in meetings with Sinn Féin between 1991 and 1993. A third Hume/Adams statement called on the British Government to "respond positively and quickly" to the "opportunity for peace". December The Downing Street Declaration was launched by Albert Reynolds and John Major. The declaration affirmed the right of the people of the Six Counties to self-determination and also stated that Ireland would be united, if a majority of the Six Counties population were in favour of such a move. It also pledged the governments to seek a peaceful constitutional settlement and said that parties linked with paramilitaries could take part in discussions on the North's future, if all paramilitary activity stopped. Within hours it became clear the two governments had different interpretations of the document. When Sinn Féin sought clarification, John Major said: "There was nothing more to tell".
1994 January Sinn Féin initiated a public consultation process through a series of peace commissions, asking the general public to give its response to the Declaration. Adams slammed John Major's refusal to clarify the Declaration. On 15 January, an Irish Independent poll found that 74% of people in the 26 Counties favoured a united Ireland. The Dublin Government allowed Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act to lapse, ending 22 years of direct political censorship. The legislation was not repealed, however, and the undemocratic power to censor by Ministerial order remains in situ to this day. February Bill Clinton gave Gerry Adams a visa to visit the United States. The Sinn Féin leader's subsequent visit to the US, opposed by the British Government, internationalised the issue of conflict resolution in Ireland. March Óglaigh na hÉireann announced a three-day suspension of offensive military operations in a move to reflect its "willingness to be positive and flexible". May The British Government responded to Sinn Féin's 20 questions June The UVF killed six nationalists and wounded five others, as they watched Ireland play Italy in the World Cup at O'Toole's bar in Loughinisland, Co.Down. An Phoblacht revealed that the total number of attacks by loyalists on bars and clubs since 1971 amounted to 80, with almost 160 people killed. July Sinn Féin delegates and party members met in Letterkenny to democratically discuss and endorse the Ard Chomhairle's response to the Downing Street Declaration. August On 31 August, the IRA released a statement announcing a cessation of all activities from midnight. September Gerry Adams pledged in conjunction with John Hume and the then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds the party's total commitment to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving political problems. The three leaders shared an historic handshake. The British removed the broadcasting ban on Sinn Féin. October Sinn Féin held an internal conference in Dublin to discuss developments. The Forum for Peace and Reconciliation opened in Dublin Castle. Gerry Adams made an appearance on the Late Late Show and had his offer to shake Gay Byrne's hand rejected. The Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a cessation. November The Fianna Fáil/Labour coalition in the 26 Counties collapsed. The Fine Gael-led coalition under John Bruton that followed was seen as a stumbling block to the process. December The first official meeting was held between British Government officials and Sinn Féin. The government claimed decommissioning was an obstacle to progress, but would not answer Sinn Féin's questions about demilitarisation. Sinn Féin produced a demilitarisation map, detailing the massive number of British military posts in Ireland.
1995 February John Major and John Bruton launched their 'Framework' document, which included plans for a Six-County Assembly. July Sinn Féin pulled out of talks with the British Government, after the British introduced the issue of decommissioning. The party said the subject had not been on the table when the IRA called their cessation. Residents of the Lower Ormeau Road were hemmed into their area as the RUC forced an Orange Order march down the road. November US President Bill Clinton shook Gerry Adams' hand in a Falls Road cafe during his first visit to Belfast. December The head of the International Body on Decommissioning, former US Senator George Mitchell, invited submissions on arms decommissioning from all parties.
1996 January The Mitchell report was published, laying down six principles of non-violence for entry into all-party talks. February The IRA ended its cessation with the bombing of Canary Wharf after the British Government failed to live up to its commitments. Sinn Féin had engaged positively with the International Body on Decommissioning in 1995 and 1996 in an attempt to resolve the impasse, and despite the bad faith of the Major government (Major demanded a statement of surrender from the IRA), used all its influence to sustain the first cessation for a full 17 months, until the rejection by Major of the report of the International Body on Decommissioning. March Sinn Féin was turned away from a consultative process organised by the two governments. May In the Six-County Forum elections to all-party talks, Sinn Féin polled a record vote. June Sinn Féin was barred from the opening of inter-party talks. Garda Jerry McCabe was killed in an IRA raid on a post office in Adare. Five IRA activists were arrested and imprisoned. October The IRA bombed the British Headquarters in Ireland, Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn.
1997 May Results in the British General Election put Labour Party leader Tony Blair into 10 Downing Street and returned Gerry Adams and party colleague, Martin McGuinness, as MPs. June Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin was elected TD for Cavan/ Monaghan. A Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats government was formed in the 26 Counties, with Bertie Ahern taking over as Taoiseach. Blair visited the North and gave the go ahead for exploratory contacts between government officials and Sinn Féin. July On 21 July, the IRA announced its second cessation in three years. Sinn Féin had undertaken a number of political initiatives to bring about this cessation. British Secretary of State Mo Mowlam said she would monitor activity over the following six weeks to decide if Sinn Féin would be admitted to all-party talks scheduled for 15 September. Violence on the Garvaghy Road brought a renewed call for a proper policing service in the Six Counties and an end to Orange Order parades being forced through nationalist areas. August An international decommissioning body was set up to deal with the weapons issue. September Sinn Féin signed up to the Mitchell Principles and entered all party-talks. The Ulster Unionists joined the talks, but the DUP stayed away. The UUP's Ken Maginnis rejected the hand of friendship from Gerry Adams at multi-party talks in Stormont, and accused the British Labour government of bringing "murderers to the table of democracy". October Adams and McGuinness met Blair for the first time at Stormont Castle buildings.
1998 April The Good Friday Agreement was signed, with Sinn Féin members endorsing it at the party's Ard Fheis in Dublin on 18/19 April. May After securing party support for the Good Friday Agreement, Sinn Féin campaigned for it in both referendums. Despite the risk of destabilising its own constituency, the party sought and secured support to amend its constitution to remove a 75-year-old ban on members taking seats in any Northern Assembly. The IRA also worked constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning. The people of Ireland, in referenda North and South, voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Good Friday Agreement. July On 1 July, David Trimble was elected First Minister and Séamus Mallon Deputy First Minister of the new Northern Assembly. David Trimble then sought to have Sinn Féin excluded from the Executive. The summer passed with no Executive formed. The Orange Order began its siege at Drumcree and the three Quinn children were burnt alive in their Ballymoney home by loyalist arsonists. August Dissident republicans bombed Omagh town centre, killing 29 people. October The 31 October deadline for completion of a programme of work and the establishment of the Shadow Executive and the Shadow Ministerial Council was not met. A different mechanism was established. December Agreement on these matters was reached on 2 December. The UUP reneged on this agreement on 3 December, then agreed again on 18 December but then deferred any movement and attempted to re-negotiate.
1999 March The British Government promised to trigger the d'Hondt Principles (allocating power in the Assembly in accordance with the strength of support for a party), but failed to do so. April Instead, on 1 April in the Hillsborough Declaration — an attempt to further meet UUP demands — the two governments made proposals on the Executive and on the issue of decommissioning which were outside the terms of the Agreement. One year after the signing of the Agreement, no progress had been made. May On 14 May in Downing Street, agreement was reached between the two governments, the UUP and Sinn Féin to establish the Shadow Executive the following week. The UUP reneged on this the following day. June Sinn Féin made massive gains in the local elections in the 26 Counties and raised its European vote. July The Way Forward statement by the two governments was issued at Castle Buildings on 14 July. This was subsequently developed unilaterally by the British Government into draft legislation tabled on 12 July, which was outside the terms of the Agreement. On 15 July, David Trimble once again failed to establish the Executive. Séamus Mallon resigned. On 24 July, against this difficult backdrop, the Sinn Féin negotiating team reported to the Ard Chomhairle on the preliminary discussions with Senator Mitchell and the British Government in respect of a review. The IRA blamed the British Government's continuous capitulation to the unionist veto for the political crisis. September The Patten report on policing was published. It met with stringent resistance from unionists, but was seen by republicans as the bare minimum of what was needed to be done to fix policing in the Six Counties. November On 15 November, the Mitchell Review concluded with proposals that:
On 27 November, a meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council created a new precondition and a new false deadline on the issue of decommissioning. Then on 29 November, almost 20 months after the Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Executive was finally established. December On 13 December the inaugural meeting of the all-Ireland Ministerial Council was held in Armagh and six all-Ireland implementation bodies were established.
2000 February On 11 February, Secretary of State Peter Mandelson unilaterally suspended the political institutions, at the behest of unionism. This was despite the fact that a new and significant proposition to resolve the arms issue had been laid on the table. May The two governments published a joint statement agreeing to re-establish the institutions and to implement the outstanding aspects of the Good Friday Agreement. On Saturday 6 May the IRA issued a statement stating that it would "initiate a process that will completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use". On 30 May, power was restored to the political institutions including the Assembly, Executive and all-Ireland bodies. June The IRA announced it had re-established contact with the Commission on Decommissioning and that a number of its dumps have been inspected. In October, the dumps were re-inspected. August Further calls were made by republicans for British demilitarisation. December The IRA detailed the commitments it expected the British Government to fulfil to create the context for a process of putting weapons beyond use. These included "the implementation of Patten; to progressively take all the necessary steps to demilitarise the situation; to deal with matters relating to human rights, equality and justice; to resolve issues which remain outstanding at this stage in the development of the Peace Process".
2001 March Further talks at Hillsborough failed to provide a breakthrough on the restoration of Sinn Féin Ministers' attendance at North-South Ministerial Council meetings, which was being blocked by David Trimble. The IRA announced it had decided to enter into further discussions with the IICD and General de Chastelain confirmed its re-engagement. The Stevens' team, investigating the murder of Patrick Finucane, was forced to quit its offices at an RUC complex in Carrickfergus, after they were burned down in suspicious circumstances. May Trimble threatened to resign as First Minister on 1 July if the IRA had not begun decommissioning by then. Meanwhile, two international inspectors confirmed they had carried out a third inspection of the arms dumps and that the weapons remained unused. The IRA responded to Trimble's threats, reminding him they had met the decommissioning body four times since March. Sinn Féin had four MPs elected in the Westminster election, Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, Pat Doherty and Michelle Gildernew. June In a briefing with An Phoblacht, the IRA said it had honoured all its commitments made in the seven years since the cessation, and said that the arms issue would not be resolved through ultimatums. July Talks at Weston Park ended with government officials sent away to draw up a package on policing, demilitarisation, the stability of the political institutions and decommissioning. August The two governments published proposals on police reform and demilitarisation designed to create the context sought by the IRA for decommissioning to take place. The IICD announced that the IRA had proposed a method to put its weapons beyond use. The IRA confirmed this two days later. Trimble again claimed the statement was not enough and the Assembly was suspended for one day by Northern Secretary John Reid. It was restored on 12 August, giving a further six-week period for an agreement to be found. September Catholic schoolchildren and their mothers came under attack from loyalist thugs in north Belfast as they tried to make their way to Holy Cross school. The 'protest' against the children of Ardoyne walking to school continued for some time, and the world looked on horrified. Unionists used the 11 September bombings in America as another excuse not to talk to Sinn Féin. The IRA said it would intensify its engagement with the IICD. October The UUP tabled a motion to exclude Sinn Féin from the Executive, claiming the IRA had failed to decommission. Following the defeat of this motion, the UUP Ministers withdrew from the Executive. Gerry Adams announced he and Martin McGuinness had asked the IRA to move on decommissioning and this was followed by a statement form the IRA saying it had implemented proposals to put arms completely and verifiably beyond use. November The RUC was renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Trimble was re-elected First Minister of the Assembly.
2002 January A break-in at the Special Branch office in Castlereagh was blamed on republicans. April The IRA made another move to put a quantity of arms beyond use, described by General de Chasteain as "substantial". The IRA denied any involvement in the Castlereagh break-in. May Five Sinn Féin TDs were elected and the Fianna Fáil/PD coalition was returned to power. June Alex Maskey was elected Mayor of Belfast. July The IRA apologised to families of non-combatants killed during the conflict. September The IRA restated its commitment to the Peace Process in an exclusive interview with An Phoblacht. However, it said, "sections of the British military and its intelligence agencies, including the Special Branch, are still at war". October The trial of the Colombia Three — Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley and Jim Monaghan - arrested in August 2001, began. The Assembly was suspended after the PSNI stormed into Sinn Féin offices in the Executive and claimed they had found intelligence dossiers. Subsequently, the serious charges of intelligence gathering against the one woman and three men arrested at Stormont would be dropped. On 31 October, the IRA suspended contact with the IICD. The army said that unacceptable and untenable ultimatums had been placed on them, while the British Government had not kept its own commitments.
2003 April The two governments came forward with a Joint Declaration, which agreed to move forward on some of the promises not followed through after the Agreement. However, the document also proposed the setting up of the Independent Monitoring Commission to monitor paramilitary activities, a body outside the terms of the Agreement. Republicans rightly feared it would be used against them. In this month also, the recommendations of the Stevens' Report were published, although not the report itself, proving that there was institutional collusion between the British state and loyalists throughout the conflict. Sinn Féin's Alex Maskey pointed out the report was only the tip of the iceberg. May The Assembly elections were postponed by the British Government. October Judge Peter Cory delivered his reports to the two governments into eight controversial killings during the conflict. The UUP backed out of a series of choreographed moves designed to get the Assembly up and running again. Following significant gestures on arms by the IRA and a statement reiterating the army's complete commitment to peace, Gerry Adams made a ground-breaking statement on the Peace Process. At the last minute, Trimble refused to accept the gesture or live up to his side of the deal and the two governments failed to push him, despite republicans fulfilling their side of the bargain. November Sinn Féin became the largest nationalist party in the Six Counties, winning 24 seats in the Assembly elections to the SDLP's 18. The DUP become the largest unionist party, taking 30 seats. The 26-County Government published its sections of the Cory Report.
2004 January The Independent Monitoring Commission came into effect. Judge Cory made it public that he had recommended public inquiries into the cases investigated in his report. April The British Government finally published censored versions of its sections of the Cory Report and agreed to set up inquiries into the deaths of Rosemary Nelson, Robert Hamill and Billy Wright, but cited the ongoing investigation into the Patrick Finucane case as reason not to establish an inquiry into his death. The Colombia Three were found innocent on charges of training left-wing Guerrillas in Colombia. The IMC claimed the IRA was still active and imposed financial sanctions on Sinn Féin. Adams slammed the Dublin Government for going along with the IMC. June In European elections across the country and local elections in the South, Sinn Féin got two MEPs elected and its largest number of councillors (126) ever. July All-party talks were announced for September.
How the Northern Ireland Office has put the Peace Process at risk Over the last few months Sinn Féin has been highlighting the ongoing campaign by securocrats within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) to dismantle the Good Friday Agreement and ultimately put the entire Peace Process at risk. This week An Phoblacht details how the NIO campaign has been conducted. When the Stormont parliament was prorogued in 1972, after 50 years of sectarian one-party rule by the Unionist Party, it was replaced by direct British rule. Legislative and executive power went to London, ultimately to the office of the British Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street. But it was the Northern Ireland Office, established in 1972 that was — and still is — responsible for the day to day running of British rule in the Six Counties. It co-ordinated the British war of counter-insurgency and has played the most malign role in Irish politics — colluding with loyalist paramilitaries, setting up torture centres, constructing an emergency powers system which completely undermines human rights, actively supporting discrimination and undermining efforts to create a peace process. It has been, in effect, the British War Office in Ireland. Despite all the efforts and the massive resources of the NIO over two decades the Irish Peace Process was created but the NIO's negative influence has seen the process lunge from crisis to crisis and in recent years we have seen the securocrats return to the ascendancy. Sinn Féin is not alone in highlighting concerns about the negative influence of the securocrats. In 1998 Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs David Andrews, commenting on the ongoing leaks from the NIO said: "It would appear that the leaker — or the leakers — are opposed to the Peace Process". He went on to say: "Sneaky little people in the Northern Ireland Office are not going to obstruct us in the pursuit of what we all seek to achieve — a permanent peace on the island of Ireland." Sinn Féin wants to see progress in the Peace Process, but for this to happen British Prime Minister Tony Blair has to get his system in order. He has to face up to the reality that there are those within his system who are against the Good Friday Agreement. You cannot have one layer of government supporting the Good Friday Agreement while another, the NIO, is actively working to undermine it. Political Interference The NIO has led the way in undermining the Peace Process and this includes opposing the British Government's position of supporting the Good Friday Agreement, appeasing negative unionism, creating a two-tier approach to the issue of victims, orchestrating the highly political and public raid on Sinn Féin offices, collapsing the political institutions, creating a partisan commission with the sole purpose of attacking Sinn Féin and, this summer, overturning Parades Commission rulings on the Springfield Road, Lurgan and Ardoyne. Destructive leaks to undermine the Good Friday Agreement Since the beginning of the Peace Process there have been numerous destructive leaks to the media from individuals inside the NIO. All of these leaks have one thing in common — they are designed to impede progress at key moments. Two of the most publicised leaks were July 1997 when the 'gameplan' for forcing an Orange march down the nationalist Garvaghy Road was leaked and in June 1998 when a confidential memo relating to the talks was given to the media. Collusion The British government and NIO are still concealing collusion between British forces and pro-British death squads. In July 2004 it was discovered that a dossier with the details of 400 people had gone missing from Castlereagh Crown Forces Base and the UDA has claimed that it is in their possession. Despite the fact that the lives of these people are at risk the NIO has refused to comment other than stating that 28 members of the RIR have been withdrawn from duty. The NIO is attempting to cover up this scandal. The issue of collusion goes to the heart of the NIO's role as the British War Office in Ireland. That is why it is so determined to suppress collusion as a political issue. Even a glance at the background will tell us why. In 1989 Douglas Hogg, a Home Office Minister, told MPs in the House of Commons that some solicitors in the Six Counties were "unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA", just weeks before Belfast lawyer Pat Finucane was murdered. Hogg, who went on to become a Cabinet member, made his remarks after a briefing from senior Royal Ulster Constabulary officers. Former British Secretary of State Tom King caused a public outcry when he gave a character reference to British agent Brian Nelson who was responsible for dozens of murders. This is not ancient history. The loyalist gangs sponsored by the British securocrats for decades are still operating and are capable of intensifying their attacks at key periods. For example over a three-month period in 2002 there were 363 attacks against Catholics — on average four sectarian attacks per day. This included 144 bomb attacks, 25 shooting incidents, 151 homes damaged, 42 people assaulted and the murder of Gerard Lawlor by loyalists as he walked home along the Antrim Road. International distortion of the truth by the NIO Over the last decade the NIO has been engaged in a very deliberate campaign internationally to undermine the Peace Process. Leading NIO officials have travelled extensively in the US where, for example, in October 2002 they deliberately distorted and misinterpreted a key speech delivered in Belfast by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In that speech Blair stated: "It is time for acts of completion. We will do our best to carry on implementing the Agreement in any event. But, should real change occur, we can implement the rest of the Agreement, including on normalisation, in its entirety and not in stages but together." After spinning by the NIO Political Directorate the speech was presented very differently. "There needed to be 'acts of completion' by republicans, rendering the transition to 'exclusively peaceful means real, total and permanent'. In turn, all parties would need to commit to the future stability of the institutions. If this happened, then all of the outstanding elements of the Good Friday Agreement - including normalisation of security arrangements in NI in line with the level of threat — could be implemented'. When Judge Peter Cory issued his report on collusion last year he recommended a public inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane. But the NIO falsely stated that he opposed an inquiry because of the implications for those currently before the courts. The NIO is hollowing out the Good Friday Agreement The NIO has been responsible for hollowing out key sections of the Good Friday Agreement on political institutions, policing, demilitarisation. parades, justice, human rights, equality, flags and symbols. Political Institutions The Good Friday Agreement provides for a "democratically elected Assembly, which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority." The NIO did a side deal with unionists in November 1999 during the Mitchell Review to introduce legislation outside the terms of the Agreement and giving the British Secretary of State powers to suspend the political institutions. These powers were first used on 11 February 2000 and the Assembly is currently in its fourth suspension. Suspension legislation has hung over the entire process since its introduction. Policing Under the Good Friday Agreement a Commission was to be formed to bring forward proposals to create a policing service, which would "enjoy widespread community support". The Patten Commission was duly established. From the outset the NIO sought to undermine nationalist hopes by packing the Commission with individuals with no understanding or sympathy with the nationalist position. The Commission's secretariat was undermined through the presence of RUC officers and unionist civil servants from within the NIO. The Patten Commission reported in September 1999 and made 175 recommendations. British Secretary of State Peter Mandelson, political head of the NIO, produced the first Police (NI) Bill on 16 May 2000. It was supposed to give effect to the Patten recommendations. In reality it gutted them. The NIO sought to change the Patten recommendations in a number of key areas:
The NIO Policing Bill implemented 11 recommendations in full, subverted completely 89 recommendations and partially dealt with another 75. Since then Sinn Féin has secured amending legislation to try to rectify the damage. However there is still much more work to be done before we reach the Good Friday Agreement commitment to an acceptable policing service. Demilitarisation The Good Friday Agreement promised that we would see a "normalisation of security arrangements and practices". That was over six years ago. There are currently over 13,000 British soldiers in the Six Counties. There are over 11,500 PSNI members. There are over 30 British Army installations including numerous spy posts. There are 13 joint PSNI/British Army bases. There are more than 140 PSNI bases. The PSNI remains militarised. Low level helicopter flights continue. Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) The IMC is not part of the Good Friday Agreement. It was conceived by the NIO at the behest of unionists to be used as a tool to exclude republicans from the political institutions. The IMC is also attempting to reintroduce the NIO policy of 'political vetting' which was used in the late 1980s and early 1990s to discriminate against community projects in nationalist areas. Parades The NIO was directly responsible for forcing the Orange Order parade along Garvaghy Road in 1996 after a sustained campaign by unionist political leaders and paramilitaries brought weeks of sectarian violence onto the streets. The formation of the Parades Commission was designed to remove the power on parades away from unionist securocrats within both the PSNI and the NIO. This summer we have witnessed a fightback from these securocrats. Loyal Order parades in Lurgan and Ardoyne were deliberately allowed to breach the Parades Commission determinations after the intervention of the NIO at a political level and the PSNI on the ground. Human Rights The Good Friday Agreement sought to guarantee "Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity". It provided for the establishment of Human Rights Commissions (HRC) in the Six and 26 Counties. The NIO ensured that the legislation governing the Human Rights Commission would not allow for the range of powers or resources needed to address its remit. The NIO's oversight of recruitment to the Human Rights Commission resulted in an unbalanced Commission and therefore unbalanced human rights approaches. It also influenced the HRC's damaging approach on the proposed Bill of Rights. Since it was established four Human Rights Commissioners have resigned on points of principle. The NIO has interfered with the independence of the Human Rights Commission by vetting their budget. This interference was criticised by the Joint Human Rights Committee at Westminster. Ignoring the demand for independence the NIO and the HRC produced a joint plan of action designed to restore public confidence in the HRC. The approach to the action plan has further compromised the position of the HRC. The NIO has produced flawed criteria for the next round of appointments to the Human Rights Commission. The NIO has slowed down the progress towards a Bill of Rights and long-fingered progress on the Charter of Rights for the island. Equality The Good Friday Agreement provided for the establishment of an Equality Commission. The NIO oversight of the recruitment process ensured that it was unbalanced in its composition. In advance of the legislation forming the Commission, the NIO lobbied to ensure it would lack the powers to recommend sanctions against those in breach of equality legislation. The British Secretary of State has the final say on whether breaches have taken place, not the Equality Commission. Good Friday Agreement obligations to tackle key equality issues such as the unemployment differential through Targeting Social Need and a range of measures aimed at combating unemployment have been minimalist and deliberately constructed to delay progress. The NIO is opposed to the outworking of the Section 75 equality duty and its influence is evident in the failure of Departments to produce substantive equality or Targeting Social Need-related outcomes that are required to achieve the stated objectives of the Good Friday Agreement. Flags and Symbols The Good Friday Agreement requires that "symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what action might be required." The NIO failed to put in place monitoring arrangements. It introduced an Order in Council (Flags Order 2000) giving power over flying of flags to the British Secretary of State. In February 2002 the NIO moved to retain British symbols in Court Buildings in direct contravention of the recommendations of the Criminal Justice Review. What is the Northern Ireland Office? British Secretary of State Paul Murphy is the head of the Northern Ireland Office, which has responsibility for 'security', policing and prisons, criminal justice, victims and human rights. The NIO has many layers, branches and divisions dealing with these issues and it is run by a 'permanent government' of senior civil servants, many of whom have been in place for several decades. Within this system there is an ethos which is unionist and anti-agreement and which is led by securocrats who are pursuing a policy contrary to the British Government's stated support of the Good Friday Agreement. Since the collapse of the political institutions Paul Murphy, along with four Junior Ministers, has responsibility for running the departments established by the Assembly. These junior ministers — John Spellar, Ian Pearson, Angela Smyth and Barry Gardiner — are all British Labour MPs based in England. In reality the departments are run by the NIO from its offices in Stormont Castle and Millbank in London.
Gerry Adams: "Sinn Féin can say yes to political package" Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams was joined by party negotiators Martin McGuinness MP, Gerry Kelly MLA, Caitriona Ruane MLA, Cllr. Joe Reilly, Michelle Gildernew MP and Mitchel MclAughlin MLA at a press conference this evening. Mr Adams said: "On Wednesday 17th November, Sinn Féin received a proposed outline for comprehensive agreement from the two governments. This included draft statements dealing with issues which are the responsibility of the governments, the DUP, Sinn Féin, the IICD and the IRA. The bulk of these dealt with outstanding aspects of the Good Friday Agreement as well as the DUP position on IRA arms. I will deal with that matter in a minute. I believe that Sinn Féin can say yes to the political package, as now presented. I have conveyed this in writing to the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister. I am satisfied that we have defended the fundamentals of the Good Friday Agreement, including its power-sharing, all-Ireland and equality provisions, that we have resolved issues of concern and succeeded in strengthening key provisions. The Good Friday Agreement requirement that parties commit to power sharing has been protected in the new arrangements for the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers as has the joint and equal nature of the positions of the First and Deputy First Ministers. In addition to successfully defending the Good Friday Agreement, we have made significant progress across a range of other important issues. There has been a singular focus, particularly by the DUP, on silent IRA arms. Resolving this issue of arms is a matter for the IICD and the armed groups. Sinn Féin has used whatever influence we have to see guns taken out of Irish politics. Martin McGuinness and I have been to the IRA. I am not prepared to go into the detail of these discussions. That organisation will take its own council and make its position clear in its own time. I do expect that, in the context of a comprehensive agreement, it will deal with issues that are its responsibility. I also assume that the first people to be informed of this will be its own membership. I’m not going to speculate on the detail of the IRA position. However, I can tell you that I do not believe that the IRA will allow itself to be humiliated. If the IRA does take initiatives in support of a comprehensive agreement this will be hugely painful for Irish republicans and nationalists. None of us is in any doubt about that. So I am appealing to republicans to be thoughtful and measured in responding to any future developments as they have been through decades of struggle. I am appealing directly to all those who support Irish Unity and independence to remain united and to support the efforts of Sinn Féin in these testing times. I recognise that some unionists do have genuine concerns about verification of arms being put beyond use, but Ian Paisley has to recognise also that the IRA will not submit to a process of humiliation. I do not expect Ian Paisley, or the DUP or the unionist paramilitaries to submit to such a process of humiliation. In my view the two governments know the significance of what is available from republicans. This is not a time for them to pander to unrealisable DUP demands. There is now, in the view of the Sinn Féin leadership, the opportunity to deal with genuine concerns about the IRA to the satisfaction of all reasonable people. In contrast, the public position of the DUP leadership on the issue of power sharing with Sinn Féin, the largest nationalist party, up to this point, remains a huge difficulty. The DUP leader, Ian Paisley, refuses to meet with us, or to accept our democratic mandate or to share government power with us. This is a difficulty which only he can resolve. For republicans and nationalists the prospect of sharing power with the DUP is not particularly attractive. But Sinn Féin is committed to that because we recognise the DUP’s electoral mandate. Both the DUP and Sinn Féin have much to do to make this process a success. But the prize of a just and lasting peace demands that of all responsible political leaders. There is also a huge responsibility on the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister, who currently has jurisdiction over this part of our island, to move forward on the delivery of the modest rights and entitlements set out, almost 7 years ago, in the Good Friday Agreement. We now have an unprecedented opportunity to move forward on the basis of partnership, equality and justice. I urge the DUP to join us in this historic endeavour."
IRA will not wear 'sackcloth and ashes' The IRA confirmed in a short statement last night that it has been in talks with the IICD's General John de Chastelain. The statement said: "The IRA leadership confirms that our representative has been in contact with and has met with the IICD". Hopes of an agreement to restore devolved government in the six counties were dashed by recent comments from DUP leader Ian Paisley. The Free Presbyterian fundamentalist, by linking his public demands for photographs of the IRA putting arms beyond use with his public statements of 'humiliation' of the IRA and their wearing 'sackcloth and ashes', has made it impossible for further progress to be made on the decommissioning issue. Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams MP recognised this yesterday when he said: "I can tell you that I do not believe that the IRA will allow itself to be humiliated ... I recognise that some unionists do have genuine concerns about verification of arms being put beyond use, but Ian Paisley has to recognise also that the IRA will not submit to a process of humiliation. "I do not expect Ian Paisley or the DUP or the unionist paramilitaries to submit to such a process of humiliation." Taoiseach Bertie Ahern also seemed to recognised this when he told the Dáil yesterday: "There is one major difficulty and I don't see the resolution in that, quite frankly. "Both parties have a strong, determined view of how they see that, and it has concerned me for some weeks about how this issue can be resolved." Mr Ahern and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair are expected in Belfast this afternoon where they are due to give an account of their proposals to restore devolved government at Stormont, detailing the progress made during recent negotiations. It is thought Mr Ahern and Mr Blair will point to the progress made on issues such as policing, demilitarisation and the workings of the Stormont Assembly.
From www.nio.gov.uk: PROPOSALS BY THE The documents presented here constitute the proposed agreement which the British and Irish Governments sent to Sinn Fein and the DUP. Despite intensive efforts over a number of months and very considerable progress, not all elements were agreed. We hope the people of Northern Ireland will reflect on what has been achieved and on the opportunity which this agreement, if accepted in its entirety, represents. For our part, we intend to press ahead to find ways of bridging the remaining gaps. Proposals by the British and Irish Governments for a Comprehensive Agreement 1 . Following intensive discussions at Leeds Castle and subsequently involving all the parties represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly, a basis for agreement has now been reached on the key issues identified by the Prime Minister, the Taoiseach and the parties at Lancaster House in June. These include the need to bring all forms of paramilitary activity to an end; the need to decommission all paramilitary weapons; the need for a clear commitment on all sides to the stability of the political institutions; and for the achievement of support for policing from all sides of the community. 2 . Together with the fulfilment of the commitments of the two Governments relating to the full implementation of the Agreement, all of these issues have been addressed satisfactorily. There is now a basis on which we can look forward to the early restoration of the Assembly, with the prospect of stable and inclusive powersharing government in Northern Ireland and the full operation of the North-South and East-West arrangements. The enabling steps to achieve these objectives are outlined in the annexed timetable. 3 . The Governments have made clear consistently that they remain committed to the fundamentals of the Agreement reached in 1998, including the need for consent to constitutional change, for absolute commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means, for stable inclusive partnership government, for a balanced institutional accommodation of the key relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South and between these islands and for equality and human rights to be at the heart of the new dispensation in Northern Ireland. None of the parties in the review of the operation of the Agreement conducted this year have dissented from these fundamental elements. Paramilitary activity and decommissioning 4 . We are confident that steps will now be taken to provide for an immediate, full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary activity by the IRA. As regards IRA weapons, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning will issue a report later today which sets out the way forward in terms of a definitive programme to ensure that the process is completed by the end of December 2004. These developments are momentous. The prospect of a new era of lasting peace and stability, involving the ending of all paramilitary activity and other illegal activity, requires all sides to respond positively. For their part, the Governments are determined to ensure that this unprecedented opportunity for peace is secured and sustained. This major step forward by the IRA underlines the need for rapid progress in regard to the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons from all sources. We urge all parties and relevant groups to use their influence now to address the question of arms in the possession of loyalist paramilitaries. Political Institutions 5 . The Governments and the parties have been anxious to see the earliest possible ending of the suspension of the Northern Ireland Institutions. In addition, based on the extensive discussions in the Review, the Governments have made an assessment of what changes to the operation of certain aspects of the Agreement would be broadly acceptable to the parties. Based on this assessment, the British Government will lift suspension in February 2005 once legislation has been introduced in the British Parliament to amend a number of aspects of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and related legislation. This legislation will also provide for the removal of the power of suspension. This will enable the institutional changes outlined in the attached annex to come into effect before the formation of the new Executive. 6 . To allow the parties to prepare adequately for the re-establishment of the political institutions, the British Government will also introduce legislation in December to allow the formation of a shadow Assembly. This shadow period will take effect on the completion of IRA decommissioning, at the beginning of January. Prior to this shadow period, following the IICD statement that the decommissioning process has commenced, it is envisaged that names of candidates for First and Deputy First Minister will be made public by the appropriate parties. Policing and Justice 7 . There have been extensive discussions about prospects for extending support across all sections of the community for the new policing arrangements in Northern Ireland. On the basis of these discussions, including on the key related issue of the devolution of justice and policing, we have a strong expectation that this process of decision making by Sinn Fein will be undertaken quickly. If required, the British Government will make appropriate arrangements to facilitate Sinn Fein membership of the new Policing Board once this decision making process has concluded. The Governments expect that Sinn Fein will be in a position to join the Policing Board no later than the date on which the Bill enabling devolution of policing and justice is enacted. 8 . The prospects for the devolution of responsibility for policing and justice will be influenced by the effective implementation of all the developments listed in this document. Against that background, the British Government will initiate discussions with the parties on the modalities of devolution as soon as the IICD has confirmed the completion of IRA decommissioning, with the aim of agreement by the time the Executive is established. On that basis the British Government will commit to introducing into Parliament by the summer of 2005 the legislation necessary to permit devolution to take place. Such legislation will come into force as soon as possible, once sufficient confidence exists across the community, as expressed in a cross-community vote in the Assembly, proposed by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The British Government will work to promote the necessary confidence to allow such a vote to take place within two years. Conclusion 9 . All this represents major progress towards our goal of securing peace and political stability in Northern Ireland. There is a great deal of work to do in implementing the various commitments referred to here. The Governments expect that all the parties involved will carry out their commitments in this agreement in good faith and will make every effort to build the confidence and trust necessary for a stable and lasting accommodation. In addition to the verification mechanisms outlined above, both Governments will keep implementation of the agreement under close scrutiny with a view to ensuring that each and all of the commitments are fully implemented and that any default is identified and challenged. The Governments are determined that default by any one of the parties to this agreement would not be allowed to hinder the progress made by others in good faith.
ANNEX A TIMETABLE The Agreement would unfold as follows: Tuesday 7 December by 18:00 DUP and Sinn Fein confirm their agreement to the Governments. IICD confirms to Governments that it can proceed on the basis of Annex D. Wednesday 8 December 09:00 Joint Government Statement issued. 10:00 IRA Statement released (Attached C). 11:00 IICD Statement released (Attached D). 12:00 DUP Statement (Attached E). 13:00 Sinn Fein Statement on policing released (Attached F). 14:30 Prime Ministers hold press conference in Belfast. December * British Government announces legislative changes * Emergency legislation to enable a Shadow Assembly * IICD announces commencement of decommissioning process * Secretary of State for Northern Ireland convenes meeting of all MLAs * Secretary of State engages in consultations with parties and announces arrangements for an infrastructure investment seminar involving parties to be represented in the Executive * Parties indicate who their candidates for FM/DFM will be * Secretary of State further consults with parties and announces arrangements for an independently facilitated forum on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland including details of independent facilitator * IICD report confirms 100% (end-month) of IRA arms decommissioned * IMC Interim Report January * Shadow Assembly established * Secretary of State for Northern Ireland arranges meetings with prospective First Minister and Deputy First Minister * Establishment of shadow Assembly committees to consider modalities for devolution of Criminal Justice and Policing and preparations for government (including the draft Ministerial Code, draft Programme for Government and other preparatory issues needing discussion). * Enactment of necessary legislation on Strands 1-3 February * IMC report * British Government lifts suspension * Agreement reached on modalities for devolution of Criminal Justice and Policing March * FM/DFM and Executive confirmed by the Assembly * Plenary meeting of NSMC Early Summer * Plenary meeting of BIC * British Government introduces legislation giving effect to devolution of criminal justice and policing. Legislation to come into effect once sufficient confidence has been established, as expressed in a cross-community vote in the Assembly, proposed by First and Deputy First Minister.
ANNEX B Proposals by the British Government for changes in Strand One institutions following the review Introduction 1 . Enhancing collectivity and accountability. There has been general agreement that underpinning collectivity and accountability is important. Key features of existing arrangements are: * The Executive must agree a draft Programme for Government and Budget, which must be approved by the Assembly on a crosscommunity vote. * In most cases legislative proposals that require Assembly approval derive from Ministerial decisions. Where a Petition of Concern is invoked in respect of such legislation, the Assembly's decision must be on the basis of a cross-community vote; * The Pledge of Office requires Ministers to act in accordance with Executive and Assembly decisions. In the case of the NSMC and BIC, this is an explicit statutory duty, as is the report to the Assembly which Ministers must make after such meetings; * The current ministerial code requires Ministers to bring to the Executive for consideration and agreement certain matters (including those cutting across ministerial responsibilities, requiring agreement on prioritisation or adoption of a common position, or having implications for the Programme for Government); * Committees of the Assembly have a right to summon and question Ministers on any aspect of their responsibilities. * It was also the practice in the former Executive that Ministers brought for consideration there all proposals for public consultation on significant issues, primary and secondary legislation, significant policy proposals and announcements and decisions which were likely to be controversial. Ministers also circulated all papers which it was proposed to table at NSMC/BIC meetings in advance to other Ministers to enable any matter of concern to be brought to an Executive meeting for consideration. Proposals 2 . The following are proposals by the British Government, in the light of consideration in the review of Strand One issues. 3 . A statutory ministerial Code . An amendment to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 would require there to be a ministerial Code, and place a duty upon Ministers (including junior Ministers), notwithstanding their executive authority in their areas of responsibility as defined in the Agreement, to act in accordance with the provisions on ministerial accountability of the Code. The Code would reflect a requirement for safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community could participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community were protected. There would be arrangements to ensure that, where a decision of the Executive could not be achieved by consensus and a vote was required, any three members of the Executive could require it to be taken on a crosscommunity basis. 4 . The 1998 Act would be amended to require inclusion in the Code of agreed provisions in relation to ministerial accountability. Consistent with paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Agreement, this would provide for the Executive to be the forum for: (i) the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, including in particular those that are the responsibility of the Minister of Finance and Personnel. (ii) prioritising executive proposals; (iii) prioritising legislative proposals; (iv) recommending a common position where necessary - for instance, on matters which concern the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships; (v) agreement each year on (and review as necessary of) a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes (Programme for Government); (vi) discussion of and agreement on any issue which is significant or controversial and is clearly outside the scope of the agreed Programme for Government or which the First Minister and Deputy First Minister agree should be brought to the Executive. 5 . The new Code would be discussed by the parties and agreed by the Executive when formed. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister would propose the Code to the Assembly. It would have effect once endorsed by cross-community support there. Any amendments to the Code would require cross-community support in the Assembly. 6 . Assembly referrals for Executive review . An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide for referrals from the Assembly to the Executive of important ministerial decisions. Thirty members of the Assembly might initiate such a referral, within seven days of a ministerial decision or notification of the decision where appropriate. Before he could pass the referral to the Executive, the Presiding Officer, following consultation with the parties in the Assembly, would be required to certify that it concerned an issue of public importance. The Executive would consider the issue within seven days. A second referral could not be made by the Assembly in respect of the same matter. Only matters covered by the Ministerial Code, as set out above, would require a collective decision by the Executive. 7 . Reflecting the Pledge of Office . The 1998 Act would be amended to require a Minister to act in accordance with any relevant decisions of the Executive and/or Assembly. 8 . Amendments to the Pledge of Office . The 1998 Act would be amended to include a requirement in the Pledge of Office that Ministers would participate fully in the Executive and NSMC/BIC, and would observe the joint nature of the office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 9. Assembly approval of Ministers in the Executive. An amendment would be made to the 1998 Act on appointment of Ministers in the Executive. The Nominating Officer of the largest party in the largest designation in the Assembly would first make a nomination to the Assembly Presiding Officer for the post of First Minister. The Nominating Officer of the largest party in the second largest designation in the Assembly would similarly nominate for the post of Deputy First Minister. The d'Hondt procedure would then run, as already set out in the 1998 Act, to fill the Ministerial posts in the Executive. The Presiding Officer would put to the Assembly an Executive Declaration listing the entire resulting Executive (FM, DFM and Ministers). The Executive Declaration would require approval by the 50:50:50 criterion. In order to uphold the right of every party, so entitled by its electoral strength, to nominate an MLA of its choice for ministerial office, only one Executive Declaration could be tabled by the Presiding Officer. If approval was not achieved within six weeks from the date on which the Assembly first met, there would, as under the present procedures, be a new Assembly election. No minister would be allowed to remain in the Executive if he or she had not voted in favour of the Executive Declaration, and if the nominating officer of his or her party did not nominate another MLA who had done so, d'Hondt would be re-run excluding that party. Where a vacancy arose later in the office of the FM or DFM, the nominating officers of the parties entitled to nominate as above for the two offices would do so, following which the Presiding Officer would put to the Assembly a partial Executive Declaration, for approval by the 50:50:50 criterion. Where a vacancy arose in another ministerial office, it would be filled as at present. It will be a matter for the standing Institutional Review Committee referred to in paragraph 12 to consider whether the new procedures should continue beyond the life of the present Assembly. 10 . Functions of Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister . The First Minister and Deputy First Minister would reach agreement as to whether any functions of the current OFMDFM should be transferred to other departments, and would put proposals to the Executive and Assembly accordingly. 11 . Committee of the Centre . An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide for the existing Assembly Committee of the Centre to be placed on a statutory footing like that of other departmental scrutiny committees. 12 . Reviews. * An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide for the Assembly to appoint a standing Institutional Review Committee, to examine the operational aspects of the Strand One institutions. Matters to be reviewed in this way would be agreed among the parties. The Committee's reports would be considered by the Executive and Assembly, and, where agreed changes required legislative steps outside the scope of the devolved institutions, by the British Government in consultation as appropriate with the Irish Government. * The First Minister and Deputy First Minister would appoint an Efficiency Review Panel, to examine efficiency and value for money of aspects of the Strand One institutions. The FM/DFM would put to the Assembly for approval proposals for the panel's remit, which might include the size of the Assembly and the departmental structure. The Panel would take into account as appropriate the work of the Review of Public Administration. The Panel's report would be considered by the Executive and Assembly, and, where agreed changes required legislative steps outside the scope of the devolved institutions, by the British Government in consultation as appropriate with the Irish Government. 13 . Repeal of the Northern Ireland Act 2000 . In accordance with the Government's earlier commitments in the context of acts of completion, it would propose to Parliament the repeal of the 2000 Act, which provides for suspension. 14 . Community designation . An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide that an Assembly Member would not be able to change community designation for the whole of an Assembly term from that expressed at the time of nomination for election, except in the case of a change of membership of political party. Proposals by the British and Irish Governments for changes in Strands Two and Three institutions following the review The following are proposals by the British and Irish Governments, following consideration in the review of Strands Two and Three issues. 1 . Executive role in preparation for NSMC and BIC meetings. The amendment to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 on a ministerial Code, described in the British Government's Strand One proposals, would bear on Executive proceedings relating to the North-South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council. 2. The Code would provide that draft NSMC and BIC decision papers would be circulated to all Executive members within a period (to be decided by the Executive) in advance of a scheduled NSMC or BIC meeting. Any member of the Executive would have the right to seek an Executive discussion on such a paper. Notwithstanding the lead Minister's executive authority in his/her area of responsibility as defined in the Agreement, where the Code provided that certain matters should be considered/agreed in the Executive Committee (see paragraphs 3 to 5 of the British Government's Strand One proposals), this would apply to any draft NSMC/BIC decision papers falling within those agreed provisions. 3 . Attendance at NSMC and BIC. Amendments to the 1998 Act would provide for a minister with lead departmental interest in an issue under consideration at an NSMC/BIC meeting to be entitled to attend (with a power for a minister so entitled, by consent, to arrange for another minister attending to discharge his/her responsibilities), and a power for the FM/DFM to adjudicate where a Minister's lead departmental interest was disputed. There would also be a statutory obligation on FM/DFM to nominate for attendance at NSMC/BIC a replacement for a lead Minister if that Minister was not proposing to attend the meeting in question, and had not arranged for a replacement Minister to discharge his/her responsibilities. There would be a statutory power for the FM/DFM to require such relevant information from the lead department as would be necessary for the NSMC/BIC meeting in question. Finally, reflecting the existing requirement for representation of the Executive on a cross-community basis at meetings of the NSMC/BIC, there would be a statutory obligation on the FM/DFM to nominate the other Minister whose presence is necessary to fulfil that requirement. 4 . NSMC/BIC agendas. The relevant legislation would be amended as necessary to make clear that where a matter on the agenda for a meeting of the NSMC or BIC was one outside the responsibilities of a Minister due to attend, because it was outside his or her departmental responsibilities and not covered by a transfer of authority from another Minister, it would be subject to a decision of the Assembly. 5 . Review. The Northern Ireland Executive and Irish Government, under the auspices of the NSMC, would appoint a Review Group to examine objectively (1) the efficiency and value for money of existing implementation bodies and (2) the case for additional bodies and areas of co-operation within the NSMC where mutual benefit would be derived. The Group would also input into the work commissioned by the NSMC in June 2002 on the identification of a suitable substitute for the proposed Lights Agency of the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission. The Group would report with recommendations to the NSMC. Any changes to the existing arrangements would require the specific endorsement of the Assembly and Oireachtas. In the meantime, the NSMC would continue to oversee the ongoing work of the Implementation Bodies and work in the areas of co-operation. 6 . Assembly/Oireachtas scrutiny of implementation bodies. Chairs and Chief Executives of North/South bodies, when called upon and at least yearly, would appear before relevant Assembly Committees. There is provision in the South for similar arrangements in relation to the Oireachtas. 7 . North-South Parliamentary Forum. The Northern Ireland Executive would encourage the parties in the Assembly to establish a North-South parliamentary forum bringing together equal numbers from the Oireachtas and the Assembly, and operating on an inclusive basis. 8 . Independent Consultative Forum. The Northern Ireland Executive would support the establishment of an independent North/South consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations and representative of civil society. 9 . Secretariat of British-Irish Council. Following consultation with its other members, and with a view to giving further impetus to its work, the two Governments would facilitate the establishment of a standing secretariat for the British-Irish Council, if members agree. 10 . East-West Interparliamentary Framework. Following appropriate consultation with the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body, the two Governments would encourage the Oireachtas, the British Parliament and the relevant elected institutions to approve an East-West Interparliamentary Framework which would embrace all their interests. The framework would operate on an inclusive basis.
ANNEX C STATEMENT 1 . Against the background of the ongoing and protracted IRA cessations, the leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has periodically asserted the view that the political responsibility for advancing the political situation rests with the two Governments, especially the British Government and the political parties. 2 . A comprehensive agreement between the two Governments and the political parties to achieve a just and lasting peace has been secured. We welcome that. 3 . The full and speedy implementation of the comprehensive agreement now achieved, as all sides, including the two Governments, are now pledged to do, will, by removing the causes of conflict, allow Unionists and Republicans to pursue our political objectives peacefully and as equals. The future of the people of this island must be one in which the rights, identity, culture and contribution of everyone including Unionists is fully respected. 4 . The IRA leadership is determined to support this comprehensive agreement. The all-Ireland nature and implementation on an enduring basis of this agreement by the democratically elected representatives of the Irish people enables us all to take political objectives forward by peaceful and democratic means. This creates the conditions for the IRA to move into a new mode that reflects its determination to see the transition to a totally peaceful society brought to a successful conclusion. Consistent with this and recognising the need to uphold and not to endanger anyone's personal rights and safety, all IRA volunteers have been given specific instructions not to engage in any activity which might thereby endanger the new agreement. 5 . We have also made it clear that the IRA leadership will, in this new context, conclude the process to completely and verifiably put all its arms beyond use. Accordingly the IRA leadership has agreed with the IICD to complete this process in a way which further enhances public confidence and to conclude this by the end of December.
ANNEX D Elements for an IICD Statement 1 . We have had further meetings with the IRA representative and have agreed arrangements which will see all IRA arms put beyond use by the end of December 2004. We have had up-to-date assessments from British and Irish security sources of IRA arms holdings to assist us in that regard. 2 . It is our intention to issue further reports in relation to IRA arms: a statement on the commencement of the decommissioning process and a final report at the end of December, when the process of putting IRA arms beyond use is complete. The significance of such an agreement will be unparalleled. 3 . The Commission has pursued the agreed remit given to us in strict adherence to the legislative terms which govern our existence and activities. The independence and integrity of the IICD are central and indispensable elements of the decommissioning process. We continue to believe that a report by the IICD marking the successful completion of our task in respect of IRA arms is the most effective way to enhancing public confidence. 4 . We are aware, however, that some have argued that more is required in respect of the transparency of the decommissioning process. On the basis of our recent contacts with the IRA representative, we are satisfied that this will form part of our two further reports. The IRA representative has indicated that, in response to our request to agree mechanisms which would enhance public confidence in the decommissioning process, additional arrangements will be put in place. These will include the presence as observers during the process of two clergymen nominated by the two Governments following appropriate consultation. These witnesses will be able to make public statements to the following effect on publication of the final IICD Report in December: (a) that they themselves have attended each decommissioning event that has taken place since their appointment as independent witnesses; (b) that the inventory compiled by the IICD is a true reflection of what was decommissioned. 5 . In addition, the IRA representative has told us that the IRA will have photographs of the weapons and materiel involved taken by the IICD, in the presence of the independent observers. These photographs will be shown by the IICD to the two Governments and the parties at the time of the final report on IRA decommissioning and will be published at the time the Executive is established. 6 . We now look forward to progress in decommissioning the weapons held by other groups.
ANNEX E DUP Statement: 1. We welcome the new agreement and we believe that it significantly benefits the whole community and we commend it, if implemented faithfully and fully, to all those who support us and all others who want a peaceful and democratic solution within the United Kingdom to our ageold conflict. 2. During the Assembly election campaign we published policy papers and in our manifesto we set out seven Principles and seven Tests which would govern our negotiating stance. We outlined the nature of an agreement we could accept and which we believed the unionist community could support. We furthermore chose to set the agreement in a context that would ensure it was fair to all. We believe our position in the talks and the outcome of the negotiations has been completely consistent with these mandated policies, principles and tests. 3. The outworking of this new agreement has the capacity to transform our society. The settlement, if fulfilled in its entirety, can deal definitively and conclusively with the issues of IRA weapons and all its paramilitary and other illegal activity. It will be in this setting that the DUP will engage with and work, in an inclusive executive. 4. Following confirmation in reports from the IMC and the IICD, that IRA paramilitary activity of all kinds has ended we will operate and participate, in all the new arrangements. This is consistent with our mandate. In this context we intend to work together in constructive partnership with all parties in the Assembly, for the benefit of the whole community in Northern Ireland. 5. We urge paramilitary groups within the unionist community, in the light of moves by the Provisional IRA, to engage positively with the IICD to remove all illegal weapons from our society and end all paramilitary and criminal activity. 6. The DUP is a devolutionist party and wants to see policing and justice powers devolved just as soon as conditions permit. These matters affect the lives and liberties of all our citizens and must be handled with great sensitivity. There is a recognition that policing and justice functions should be devolved just as soon as the community confidence exists. We will dedicate ourselves to reach agreement on how such powers could be exercised. We will join with the other parties in intensive discussions on the devolution of criminal justice and policing in a committee of the Shadow Assembly immediately after the IICD confirms the completion of IRA decommissioning, with a view to agreement on modalities, if at all possible, by the time the Executive is established. Following the passage of the necessary legislation at Westminster we will use our best efforts to contribute towards building the community confidence which would be necessary to allow the Assembly to receive the new powers within the timescale envisaged by the British Government. This necessary confidence will be expressed through a cross-community vote in the Assembly, proposed by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 7. We judge that the key to success is the stability, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the structures and institutions. All these matters have been taken into account in the new agreement we have reached. 8. The DUP see it as imperative that the repeated suspensions that dogged the life of the Belfast Agreement and its institutions are a thing of the past and we are looking towards the uninterrupted operation of stable democratic structures. This new agreement depends on all parties honouring each and every obligation - we will meet our commitments in each Strand and in every other respect, and, to succeed, others must meet their obligations. 9. This community has been deeply divided and has suffered much in social and economic terms from the prolonged conflict. There is much to be done to create a society in which there is respect for the rights and equality of all our citizens and in which mutual trust can grow. There is a need to build a calm regard for our distinct and sometimes conflicting cultural traditions and to respect the diversity of our people. 10. Inter-community conflict still exists and people are being displaced from, and attacked in, their homes and districts, particularly along the boundaries of the interface areas. We want to see action taken to tackle all sectarianism, racism and intolerance and seek agreement on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. We trust other parties will join us in this endeavour. 11. We will work with the government and with others to prepare a financial package which can assist in the revitalisation of Northern Ireland's infrastructure and employment opportunities. Such a package should include a fund which has an emphasis on the needs of areas of social deprivation and disadvantage from both sections of our community. |
